



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

pictured in the agreeable esthetic psychosis is perhaps removed if we think of the esthetic psychosis as simply symbolizing the emotion without forcing the percipient to assume it. The esthetic psychosis is on the same impersonal and unfinished stage of the circuit as the concept. The esthetic experience is a rudimentary form of judgment involving the consciousness of emotional meaning.

This doctrine of the unfinished act, according to which we have been here considering some of the psychological categories may be briefly summarized in the assertion that *every psychosis is a stage in particularizing the excitation on its course toward overt completion*. The higher and lower cognitive functions are differentiated by the fact that the former are the functional unparticularized antecedents of the latter. *Conation and cognition are differentiated in that the conscious stage constitutes a cognitive psychosis whereas the conscious passage from one stage to its more defined subsequent stage constitutes conation*. Hence conative psychoses can not be entertained in the absence of cognition but the reverse is theoretically possible.

It has not, of course, been the intention to disregard the memorial or retrospective *derivation* of any psychosis. The point of particular emphasis is that every psychosis actually is an unfinished act in the process of being defined into an overt response.

L. L. THURSTONE.

CARNEGIE INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY.

RELATIONS BETWEEN RELATIONS.

RECENTLY I picked up a review written in a foreign tongue, and my attention was caught by familiar names. Some one had been laboring through the productions of the American new realists, as to whether relations were "external." And I was set to wondering how much of the stuff we have written, and still write, is worth anybody's trouble on the other side of the world. Most of our debates are so bad that we soon tire of them ourselves; and I suspect most of us are now tired of hearing about "external relations."

Nevertheless I here propose to reopen the question of "external-ity," though only long enough to discuss what it was all about. There is an interesting analogous case in Greek philosophy. For a more precise statement and confirmation of what I am going to say, I may appeal to the chapter on "The Predicables" in H. W. B. Joseph's *Introduction to Logic*; but as I want the illustration only "to point a moral," I shall leave out some qualifications and provisos

which strict historical accuracy would require. The analogy from Greek philosophy is as follows: Aristotle raised a question which might be put: Suppose we know that "Socrates is a man," and "Socrates is bald-headed," how is bald-headedness related to being a man? This was the question of the "predicables;" and he would have answered the specific question by saying that the predicate "being bald" was only accidentally related to "being human," it was a mere chance coincidence. What he meant by "accident" would seem here to be perfectly definite and intelligible. Other such possible relationships between predicates would be: that one should be the definition of the other, or part of its definition (*e. g.* its genus); or otherwise essentially connected with its definition and hence with it (property). But all are cases of, so to speak, predicating one predicate of another. Speaking more accurately, though not in Aristotelian terms, all are cases of sorts of relations between those predicates which may be predicated of the same subject. The "accidental" and the "essential" correlations are here pretty clearly distinguishable.

It so happened, however, that in after years, when Porphyry wrote his *Introduction* to Aristotle, he really asked another question about the predicables, and thought it was Aristotle's question. He asked: Given that "Socrates is a man," how is the universal, "being a man," related to the individual, "Socrates"?—and the realist *versus* nominalist controversy had begun! Porphyry answered his own question by saying "humanity" is Socrates' "species." This gives evidence at once of a new standpoint, distinct from Aristotle's. Species is not on Aristotle's list, for you can not predicate species of genus. On the other hand, the individual, Socrates, is indefinable. Hence we see why Porphyry dropped "definition," in order to replace it by "species," in his revised list of predicables—and it has so remained in those uncritical repositories of past philosophical blunders, the college text-books on logic, even to the present day.

There was a blunder involved, for Porphyry was now asking questions, which, in the form in which he phrased them, admitted often of no reasonable answer at all. "Socrates is bald." Is that irrelevant to the nature of Socrates; is it, in the technical sense, an "accident"? Yes. But also no, for a Socrates with bushy hair would not be our dear old questioner on Athenian street corners; he would be another, a Circassian beauty, whom history knows not of. To the individual there is nothing "accidental." All is equally essential, all internal. Behold! we have spoken the word. Everything is "internal" to the individual; hence everything to everything else, for the mere fact that Socrates did *not* know his contemporary who ruled over China, must immediately make the

Chinese emperor essential, and internal, to the full constituting of just that Socrates that really was. Had Socrates known His Celestial Majesty, another Socrates would, in so far forth, have replaced the Socrates that history records. Socrates is likewise specified by anything of which he happened to be absolutely independent; the very independence thus becomes essential; and thus independence itself turns out to be a sort of dependence. Behold, what might be involved in an incautious answer to a question that ought never to have been asked; though of course Porphyry scarcely foresaw what was in preparation for the vexing of future generations.

Now, the whole issue of internal-external, as concerns relations and things, is the same sort of an incautious answer to the same sort of a fool question. There may be some problem as to in what sense, or senses, universals are empirically found data. There is certainly a perfectly definite inquiry as to how universals, such as qualities or relations, stand to one another—as precise as Aristotle's query about the possible sorts of predicables—though the variety of types of cases complicates the answer. But as to how a universal is related to a thing, as to whether it is internal to the things to which it appertains, about that question there need be no dispute at all. It is simply and purely a convention of definition; that is to say, it is a consequence of one's definition of "thinghood."

The thing—let us take as an example yonder book—may arbitrarily, if so we decree, be defined as an *X*. It is an *X* which has color, has shape, *etc.* But in itself it is only *X*. What it *has* is not *it*. Such is the lower limit of thinghood—a mere *X*. Or perhaps you prefer and elect to say that the color and shape are parts of it, but not so its space relations to other things. The latter are external; it would still be this book were it moved into the next room. That is a second possible stage of thinghood. Or you can go on to add to the definition of the book its place among all contemporary things, including the gravitational pull upon it of the great nebula in Orion, as being an essential part of itself. But this you may supplement by saying that the present thing, the present state of the book, is an existent and event of now, and what happens in the future can not affect the present, which will then be past. What has been, has eternally been; "the moving finger having writ, moves on." The past is irrevocable; and therefore, the future can not be essential to making it what it is. Such would be another possible delimitation of thinghood. Or still again, among other possibilities, you might see fit to define the book so as to include its relations to all that you take to be objectively real, past, present, and future; but to say that my subjective thoughts, in so far as they do not issue in future overt acts, are not essential to the book. But equally

well, you can, in turn, remove this limitation also. You can say, perhaps, that all my thoughts issue in acts. Or you can say that my supposing yonder book not to be an historical work, when it actually is one, so that I do not act to open it, when otherwise a truer thought might have led me to do so, is essential to the career of yonder book, and hence part of its character. So we may go on and on, until you have included in yonder book its distance in time from the formation of volcanoes on the moon, and its place in the dreams of angels—till all time and all space, all thought and all existence, are included in its fullness. Only the world-embracing thoughts of an Absolute mind can now comprehend its entirety. Surely this is the last stage, for the whole world is in yonder book; all contrasts and differences, the very irrelevancies of things most remote, help to make yonder book what it is. But wait! This is not the last stage. We have forgotten to include the facts about the possible things that are not. It is *not* a centaur. It is *not* any of those numerous animals that the human mind has never even imagined. If it were any of these, it would obviously be different from what it is; therefore, its *not* being them is quite vitally important to making yonder book just what it is. Even the Absolute may now begin to feel some anxiety about his power to know yonder tantalizing book in all its infinite fullness. If indeed, as Mr. Philip Jourdain claims, Zermelo's harmless-looking mathematical theorem has been proved—if we so much as grant it even to be provable—then it would seem that of “the possible things that are not,” and the facts about their relation to the things that are, there is absolutely no totality whatsoever. Whatever totality of such comparisons the Absolute has thought, not carelessly and in bulk, but severally and specifically, a proof can immediately be established that there is something left out. Yonder book outruns the Absolute; there is no last stage.

The whole point of these considerations is to note that where you choose to draw the line, and say, “this much is one thing,” is always arbitrary. It is arbitrary when you take the thing as a mere *X*; but it is just as arbitrary to stop at any other stage, including a supposed last and most complete one. Thinghood is an *elastic* concept. That is why internality to a thing can have no meaning whatever, until you first define your “thing.” But thereafter this problem becomes simple and definite, and involves no puzzle nor worry. Your definition must read, “I include *this* in what I call ‘the thing,’ I do not include *that*.” The problem has thus necessarily been settled by the definition. But all concepts are not in this manner elastic. It is the task of any proper relational analysis of the world, to shift the center of interest from the elastic

india-rubber concepts of "thing," and "substance with attributes," and "cause of a thing," to concepts which do not depend simply on definition. From such a standpoint, the question of internality of relation to thing becomes a pure question of convention and definition. The real issue becomes that of the systematic interrelations, one to another, of those relations and qualities that meet together in things.

It may, at this point, be urged as a criticism, that nothing can be gained by a different selection of concepts, because all concepts are equally elastic. Thinghood is indefinite, to be sure, but so also is a universal such as redness. Just where does red go off into orange or pink? As regards this particular case, I think it quite tenable to hold that the colors are discrete, that the intermediates are mixtures, and any shade of orange is really analyzable into certain proportions of pure yellow and pure red. In that case redness will have no penumbra of vagueness. But also it would be possible to take the other alternative, and say there are various reds and oranges, and the line where one leaves off and the other begins, is an arbitrary convention. The essential point, in all cases, is, however, to be perfectly clear as to what factors are arbitrary, and what are not. It is exceedingly important that we avoid any reckless generalization, to the effect that all concepts are arbitrary, or are, through and through, mere convenient instruments. Such generalizations are sheer foolishness.

The pragmatists are sometimes annoyingly vague as well as radical in this regard, and suggest that if thought makes a distinction, or forms a concept of a universal, it can not be a real distinction, or an objectively findable universal, but is a pure invention, made only for the purpose in hand—whatever that may mean! Undoubtedly arbitrary distinctions do sometimes pragmatically "work" very well; and provided they are only arbitrary enough, subsequent experience can scarcely "refute" them. If you establish universal propositions simply by postulate—"All gold is yellow, because, by heck, that's just what I mean by gold!"—no experience could ever refute you. You would simply refuse to admit that a contrary case was gold at all. But instead of science you would then have verbal definitions of words. The "instrumental" has, very frequently, this sort of arbitrariness; the truly "experimental" can never permit it; yet pragmatist logic claims to be both at once. Or take another instance. That we count by tens is conventional. The convention is enormously convenient and works beautifully—thanks also to the arbitrary way we have of symbolizing the tens by place, that marvelous invention that we call "Arabic" numerals. Counting by tens works, it is successful, it

obviates difficulties, it leads us up to concrete facts. By most pragmatic definitions of truth, taken at their literal face value, counting by tens is the true way to count—though counting by twelves might be still truer! But counting by tens is not number; and the person who can not distinguish between these admirably successful instrumentalities on the one hand, and the science of arithmetic on the other, has not got beyond the outer gate of knowledge. Whatever may be the arbitrariness of the scientist's measuring units and index classifications, he does not want propositions, as the staple of his science, that are merely true by definition. There is an elastic side to most concepts, yes indeed, but it is always the non-elastic side that gives knowledge and science. It is ever of the first importance for us to be clear as to just where runs the dividing line.

The new realists have tried to establish that relations are, or may be, external to things. They should, instead, have swept the whole question aside with the single comment that "thinghood" is a vague popular concept. The real questions are uniformly of this sort: "Are things that are blue always extended?" or, "Are things that are blue always three inches long?" The latter coincidence is more accidental than the former, and in that sense the Aristotelian "essential" and "accidental" might well come into their own again. The question is always as to how one quality or relation stands related to, or associated with, another quality or relation, when the two meet together through their appertaining to the same "thing;" the "thing" being, for the moment, considered as a mere point of reference, whose further delimitation may be arbitrarily set. But the real question concerns a matter of interrelation, a matter of system; it has little to do with predication. From this side of Aristotle we must depart. Questions of predication arise when subjects and their attributes are the important categories of one's analysis. But a relational analysis will avoid making these categories central. Extendedness can not really be predicated of blue; it is not a predicate or attribute internal to blue. There is no such thing as "blueness" that could have predicates—except as a vicious way of speaking. There is only the fact of something's "being blue." The question thus phrases itself, not "Is blueness necessarily extended?" but, "Is whatever is blue also extended?" This sort of systematic correlation between universals, as they meet in things, is a situation that can be intelligibly discussed.

Not only can it be intelligibly discussed, but all science is such a discussion. These "relations between relations" should perhaps be called by some new and special name, to set them off from ordinary relations, such as the simpler relations of space and time. But by whatever name you call them, they constitute all systematic con-

nection. It is on this plane that "causal relations" are to be sought after—which, I take it, is the real significance of a so-called "mathematical function" theory of cause. It is on this plane that relevance finds its basis. Relevance may indeed be always "relevance to a purpose," but *why* something is relevant to a purpose is invariably a question of systematic structure among universals. Even number does not apply to concrete given data in bulk, but only as exemplifying a universal. Thus, an object before me may, as being a pencil, be one, but as being molecules, trillions. The inquirer who does not have the proper categories and point of view, will, in the analysis of relations, soon find himself tangled in snarl after snarl of pseudo-difficulties. To show how one such difficulty may be straightened out has been the aim, and I hope it is, in some degree, the accomplishment, of the present paper.

H. T. COSTELLO.

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.

A REPLY TO "THE DEFECT OF CURRENT DEMOCRACY"

THE term "democracy" is coming more and more to be a juggler's hat from which to produce the most various and conflicting meanings. In reading Professor Sheldon's recent article in this JOURNAL one could but wonder whether he might not throughout the article have substituted any one of half a dozen terms for "democracy" with almost equal precision.¹ The defect which he ascribes peculiarly to the notion of democracy might just as readily have found its explanation in Christianity, in over-population, or in the gregarious instinct, if we admit such an instinct.

Democracy is nowhere defined in the article further than as the ideal of opposition to aristocracy. Nevertheless, it is by implication identified with the "exaggerated organic view, by which individuality and society are deemed always interlocking and interpenetrating," and it is charged with the cardinal sin of over-socialization and social cowardice. The substance of Professor Sheldon's plea is that democracy is the tribal enemy of the unique individual. While agreeing fully with his argument for the value of personal independence, the writer wishes to raise the question whether democracy, considered as opposition to aristocracy, does not rest precisely on the claim of the individual to personal rights. Certainly the arch-aristocrat of Central Europe believed this when he said in 1918: "You of the Entente are out for democracy, are you, with its individualistic excesses?" In this country we find Professor Perry referring to "the principle of guaranteeing to the individual the largest possible

¹ This JOURNAL, Vol. XVI., No. 14.